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The paper discusses how the region known as Monyul, a geographical zone compromising Tawang and West Kameng districts of Arunachal Pradesh, decided to be included within the sphere of the McMahon Line (as the Indo-Tibetan border was commonly known) in the course of the Simla Convention. At the Convention in 1913-14, the Tibetan Plenipotentiary Lonchen Shatra (blon chen bshad sgra) accepted the McMahon Line in anticipation of Monyul territory no longer being the subject of further discussion, except for some private estates. However, the joint (Tibeto-) Mon administration, as the Lhasa-appointed “Manager of the Ecclesiastical office” (bla gnyer) – Thub bstan chos ’phel (r. 1949-51, the last one in office) and “the Council of Four” (bzhi sbrel) at Tawang, and the Tsona (mtsho sna) rdzong dpon continued until 1951. It ended only after Major Ralengnao Khating with hundred of Assam Rifles effectively incorporated Monyul, then known as “the Tawang Tract” (1919-46) and “Sela Sub Agency” (1946-56), into the “North-East Frontier Agency” (NEFA; 1946-72), since then Arunachal Pradesh. Subsequently, in 1952 the status quo rights document of the traditional estate and its subjects of the Tawang monastery was signed by the newly established “Assistant Political Officer, Sela Sub-Agency,” (based in Tawang) on behalf of the Government of India (GOI). Since the monastery was the centre of the former Monyul administration, the Tawang monastic [“acceptance cum] requisition” (snyan ’bul) to the GOI in 1952 constituted a landmark in this regard.

The status quo rights document is written in Tibetan and is dated the 17th day of the 8th Month of the Water-Dragon (chu ’brug) year, or the 8th July 1952. It consists of forty-five lines in dbu med script. Thus, I will argue that this document put an end to the quandary, and established the region of Monyul and its people in accordance with the Simla Convention. The year 2014 marks the hundredth anniversary of this state as well as of the McMahon Line, after the Simla Convention between Tibet and British India on 24th-25th of March, but officially declared on the 3rd of July 1914. Therefore, in view of the centenary of the McMahon Line, the paper will discuss the importance of the document, which is historically significant to ongoing Indo-Tibetan or Sino (Tibetan)-Indian boundary negotiation in the Eastern Himalayas. The related documents of the British India and Dga’ ldan pho brang Government of Tibet (GOT; 1642-1959) on the region will also be discussed in the following.
The McMahon Line, nowadays “the Line of Actual Control”, is an accepted and acknowledged boundary by the GOT, where the course of action was followed after the annexation of Tibet by the People’s Republic of China in 1951. Eventually, the Central Tibetan Administration, Dharamshala, continued the procedure. Similarly, since 1947, the GOI has duly considered that the Indo-Tibetan Boundary Agreement was finalized on 24th-25th March 1914. It followed in the footsteps of British India’s policy, which was officially declared on 3rd July 1914 at the Simla Convention. Likewise, the Chinese Government acknowledged that the “related documents were signed by a representative of the local authorities of the Tibet” in 1914. China officially agreed to the boundary, but did not agree politically.

Historically, British India’s inclusion of the “North-East Frontier Tracts” (NEFT; 1919-46) in 1914 relies on number of treaties, which had been signed with numerous local ethnic groups and tribes in the mid 19th century. The “tract” was an extension of the Assam Frontier Tract Regulation of 1880 to hilly areas, which resulted in the formation of the McMahon Line in 1914. The McMahon Line changed the concept of the “1873- Inner Line Regulation Act” of the East Bengal Frontier Regulation Act, and it became the objective of “the Outer Line, [which was] purposely left indefinite, so that we [British India] can advance the Inner Line to any extent circumstances may render necessary.” Though the “Outer Line” was under the purview of the Chief Commissioner of Assam, it was not under any definitive administration until the Simla Convention.

Thus, the extent of this “indefinite” outer line led to the formation of the NEFT as stated above. It was administered under the “Balipara Frontier Tract” and the “Sadiya Frontier Tract” from 1919-46. Prior to 1919 both the tracts were named the “Western Section” and the “Central and Eastern Section,” respectively. The sections’ names were used from 1914 onwards, when they were part of the erstwhile Darrang and Lakhimpur districts of Assam “Province” of British India. It was renamed as NEFA in 1946, and administrated by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), GOI. In August 1965, the MEA transferred the administration of the NEFA to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), and granted the status of the Union Territory of India in 1972 as Arunachal Pradesh. It obtained a status of a fully-fledged state on February 1987, and became the 24th state of the Union of India.

Monyul prior to the McMahon Line

Theoretically, the inclusion of Monyul within the McMahon Line in 1914 relates to the 1844 and 1853 treaties, whereas the 1680 edict issued by the fifth Dalai Lama Blo bzang rgya mtsho (1632-81) to the Tawang monastery and the region is connected to the GOT. The uniqueness of the Mon region, whose chieftains
had signed the 1844 and 1853 treaties, had been duly acknowledged by the lawmakers of the British Indian administration as well as later by the Indian administration. As those treaties had been signed by the chieftains of Monyul, with different titles of “Sātrājas/Rājas of extra-Towang Bhutia” (in the English sources), they had maintained a special relationship with British India and decided their destiny. The signing of the 1853 treaty was witnessed by the two Tibetan representatives of the sixth grade officials called phogs mda’. This unique relationship was indeed respected by the British officials, but seems to not be known by the Tibetan officials during the Simla Convention. This proved crucial to the incorporation of Monyul into the McMahon Line in 1914. Since then, Monyul is theoretically has been administered under the GOI, but effectively only from 1951. Its identity as homogenous Tibetan Buddhist cultural region is marked by the title of “Bhutia” or “Bhotea” in English sources. However, an exception such as recognition of indigenous laws, which was given to the kingdoms of Sikkim and Bhutan at the time to form a separate unit of administration, was not granted.

Why did British India remain silent at all about the 1844 and 1853 treaties during the Simla Convention, although they knew that Monyul was effectively under the administration of the Tawang monastery and the Tsona Dzong (rdzong)? It is recorded even in late 1913 that Secretary McMahon was reluctant to draw Monyul into the “proposed Indo-Tibetan boundary” line. However, it is unlikely that the British officials did not possess clear information about the region, given the pristine information provided in Bailey (1914) and Gait (1906). Additionally, Bailey had a meeting with McMahon on 26th November 1913 in Simla and another in early 1914, where he writes:

Mönyul [sic] is the comparatively low-lying district of Tibet which is governed by the Lamas of Tawang. It consists of the valley of the Tawang Chu down to the Bhutan frontier, the Nyamjang valley as far up as Trimo, and the Dirang valley as far down as the Aka frontier at Konie, as well as some valleys south of this down to the plains of India (Bailey 1914b: 13).

As shown in the above quotation, Bailey was well aware of the region, similarly, Gait (1906: 311) notes that “east of the Bhutan Duārs of Darrang is another, known as the Koriapara Duār, which was held by certain Bhutia [Mon] chiefs called Sātrājas, whose hills form part of the province of Towang [Tawang], an outlying dependence of Lhasa.” Accordingly, the British officials at the highest position in India were well informed about the region. Therefore, did the British officials deliberately hide the existence of the mid-19th century treaties and
their knowledge about Monyul? It is seems that the treaties information were withheld, while the British officials’ knowledge about the region was informed to the Tibetan officials partially by the Secretary McMahon. Because McMahon notes that the “Tibetan representatives [Lonchen Shatra] had no knowledge on the subject and would not commit themselves to anything definite.”

However, the private estates in Monyul as well as the areas around Tsari’s pilgrimage site were to remain open for further deliberation. Yet the British officials, particularly Charles Bell were able to pursue Lonchen Shatra to sign the agreement for the proposed boundary. Indeed Lonchen Shatra and his deputies were not known to the 1844 and 1853 treaties, and also the firmly established boundary after the 1852 accident, which resulted not to have further armed conflict in future.

Similarly, Lonchen Shatra and his deputies did not know about the re-settlement of boundary accord reached between British India and Monyul in 1872-73. The demarcation was based upon the recommendation made by Mackenzie in 1873 to the Government of Bengal that “the Tawang country is held by Bhuteas [sic] who are entirely independent of Bhutan proper, and directly under Thibet [sic]. On all occasions Thibetan officials take part in whatever is done there. Here, then, we are in actual contact with Thibet.” The recommendation resulted in what Mackenzie (1884: 18) had briefly recounted under the title of “demarcation of boundary”:

> In 1872-73 the boundary between Assam and the Towang [Tawang] Bhutias was formally laid down from the Deosham River on the west to the Rowta River on the east. The line proposed by the British officers was readily accepted by the Bhutias and by certain Thibetan officials who came down to inspect it.

The demarcation of the Indo-Tibetan boundary between Monyul and the foothill of Assam “running east-west roughly eleven miles north of Udalguri” was conducted under Major Graham, and the Sātrājas and four Tibetan officials in 1872-73. In his observation and the participation of these officials in the meeting, Major Graham pointed out that “they looked like priests, and appeared to be men of distinction and position. They were treated with great respect by, and took precedence of, the Rājas, and lastly the Rājas said the strangers had come from Lhasa on a tour of inspection.” Thus, Lamb (1966: 301) concludes that: “their presence, at all events, made the demarcation possible, since they persuaded the Mönpas [sic] to agree upon a boundary alignment.”

Therefore, what spurred British India to draw Monyul into the “Frontier Tract” of the Assam Himalayas? Because until 1912, Governor Lord Minto and his successor Lord Hardinge did not agree to include Monyul under the proposed
demarcation, but it was marked as the Indo-Tibetan border.25 The following note says what Lord Minto regards about the boundary at the Assam Himalayas in 1910:

From the east of the wedge shaped portion of Tibetan territory of the Towang district, which runs down to the British frontier north of Odalguri, in a north-easterly direction to lat. 29°, long. 94°, thence in a south-easterly direction to the Zayul Chu as far east as near Rima as possible, thence across the Zayul Chu to the Zayul-Irrawaddy divide, and then along that divide until it joins the Irrawaddy-Salween divide. Tribes in this area are believed to be mostly independent, and some of them are already under our influence.26

Based on above note, Lord Hardinge followed the demarcation of his predecessor Lord Minto until the late 1911. However, his initially opinion, thus changed after the murder of Noel Williamson and Dr. Gregorson in the central NEFA region in the same year. Even then, he supported the notion that a “wedge shaped portion of Tibetan territory of the Towang district [Monyul]” should remain, and should not be annexed within the planned boundary, as Lord Minto notes. However, it was incorporated into the agreement only in late 1913. Thus, the initial blue-print for the Simla Conference relied on Secretary Jordan telegram to Grey on 6th March 1913, where he stated:

These new facts—the elimination of Chinese influence [in Tibet] and the connection which Russia has established through Mongolia—seem to me to demand revision of our Tibetan policy and an abandonment of our disinterested attitude unless we are prepared to see Tibet, which cannot, I conceive, long stand alone, gravitate towards Russia. The first essential of such a change would be the establishment of closer relations with the Dalai Lama and a fuller knowledge of what arrangements the Tibetan Government are prepared to make. In return for a guarantee against Chinese encroachment on her eastern border, Tibet might be induced to authorise the reinstatement at Lhasa of a Chinese Amban with a suitable escort. A tripartite agreement between Great Britain, China and Tibet would probably be the best solution, and negotiations in India between the three parties would serve as a useful preliminary to such an agreement; even their failure would leave us in a better position to negotiate with Tibet independently of China.27
Why was Monyul incorporated? The region and its people, Monpa and other ethnic groups in the region being “non-Tibetan” and “watershed”, are termed as the reason behind demarcation. However, it seems a geo-strategic necessity to include Monyul within the Indo-Tibetan boundary, because in this so-called “Exchanges of Notes”, the watershed principle was not stated or recorded at all. While the geo-strategic policy became the focus after the presence of a small group of Qing dynasty’s Chinese army in Tsona in 1910, which was reported by the Indian General Staff in June 1912. This led the General Staff to be alerted that the “demarcation of the frontier line about Tawang requires careful consideration. The present boundary is south of Tawang, running westwards along the foothills from near Udalguri to the southern Bhutan border, and thus a dangerous wedge of territory is thrust between the Miri country and Bhutan.” The strategic observation and its probable outcome in the future were also highlighted in the same reports by the Indian General Staff.

Following these concerns, the report promotes the notion that the Indo-Tibetan boundary to the north of Monyul is a “comparatively easy and much used trade route [that] traverses this wedge from north to south, by which the Chinese would be able to exert influence or pressure on Bhutan, while we [British India] have no approach to this salient from a flank, as we have in the case of the Chumbi salient. A rectification of the boundary here is therefore imperative.” Thus, the earliest proposed boundary line, however, runs from “Chona [Tsona] Dzong in a direct east and west line with the northern frontier of Bhutan (see map no. 1).” Tsona was dropped in the final stages, but the inclusion of Monyul could not be avoided. However, the decision was inclined towards an expansionist policy also, as observed by the negotiator Bell (1924: 155), who commented that we “have thus gained a frontier standing back everywhere about a hundred miles from the plains of India.” Even then, he acknowledged that the strategic importance was the main reason for Monyul’s inclusion, particularly in terms of securing the northern border for British India’s trade interest in Assam.

Monyul became Part of the McMahon Line

In those circumstances, on 25th March 1914, Lonchen Shatra agreed to McMahon’s proposal for the Indo-Tibetan border:

As it was feared that there might be friction in future unless the boundary between India and Tibet is clearly defined, I submitted the map, which you sent to me in February last, to the Tibetan Government at Lhasa for orders. I have now received orders from Lhasa, and I accordingly agree to the boundary as marked in red in the two copies of the maps signed by you.
subject to the condition mentioned in your letter, dated 24th March, sent to me through Mr. Bell. I have signed and sealed the two copies of the maps. I have kept one copy here and return herewith the other.  

Besides the notes, Richardson (1998 [1945]: 546) states that Lonchen Shatra suggested the region be “quickly and tactfully” taken over. It is not known of any suggestion, but Lonchen Shatra did request “[the Government of Tibet] should slightly consider on the border of Mon’s side.” After the declaration of the Simla Convention on 3rd July 1914, British India neglected Monyul. This was due to the transfer of McMahon from India, the “financial stringency” and the outbreak of the two World Wars of 1914-19 and 1939-44. Those setbacks further restricted British India activities in the region. However, the negligence was not “forgotten”, but came to light after the arrest of botanist Kingdon-Ward in

Map 1. After Lamb (1966: 353) Redrawn by Lobsang Tenpa and Daniel Flügel
1935 being without permission in the region. Subsequently, it was raised to the Tibetan officials by Basil Gould, the Political Officer of Sikkim, on an official visit to Lhasa in 1936 (Gould 1938: 64-6).

In between, the continued ignorance of the Simla Convention by the descendants of the signatories of the 1844 and 1853 treaties and the (Tibeto-) Mon officials led to further reluctance to accept outcomes of the Simla Convention. However, after the return of Kingdon-Ward to India, he raised region being strategically important, which was once already stated by Nevill in 1928. He states that “should China gain control of Tibet, the Tawang country is particularly adapted for a secret and easy entrance into India.”

Around the same time in late 1935, Olaf Caroe, then Deputy Secretary in the Indian Foreign Department, New Delhi did talk to the Assam Chief Secretary’s about the McMahon Line, the non-publication of the Simla Convention and particularly the importance of “the Tawang Tract”. And in 1936, he requested London to take responsibility for the publication of the Simla Convention in the following manner:

There is a real danger that important matters of this kind may go wrong if we refrain any longer from publishing our agreements with Tibet...the Government of India think that there would be advantage in inserting in their published record copies of the 1914 Convention, the exchange of notes on the boundary between Sir Henry McMahon and the Tibetan Government and the Trade Regulations.

Thus the “Constitution Act of 1935” for an “Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas order, 1936” was passed, which led to the “Frontier Tract”, like the “Balipara Frontier Tract” came under the direct administration of the Governor of Assam since 1st April 1937. In 1938, in the re-edition of the 14th volume of Aitchison’s Treaties the Simla Convention is clandestinely “inserted” to the 1929 edition. This led to an open publication of the first Simla Convention and its official acknowledgement. The Indo-Tibetan border thus came to be known as the McMahon Line and was bilaterally rectified in 1938. Subsequently, a British Indian army convey under the direction of Captain Lightfoot reached Tawang on 30th April 1938. The “Tibetan Cabinet” (bka’ shag) later objected to the visit, saying that it was without Lhasa’s knowledge. However, British India’s representative Norbhu from Sikkim highlighted the 1914 agreement. Albeit with exception of Captain Lightfoot’s column, which reached Tawang, the matter was again left in the hands of the Governor of Assam, who was aided by an “Adviser” to take further action in the relationship of “the Tawang Tract”.

In 1944, James Philip Mills (1890-1960) became pioneer to the decisive reorganization of the administrative structure of the NEFT, where he was
appointed as the “advisor” (r.1943-48) to the Governor of Assam on Tribal areas.\textsuperscript{47} Thus, British India decided to incorporate this region practically under a functional administration. This led to the “establishment of posts of the Assam Rifles at Dirang Dzong (rdzi rang rdzong) and Rupa,” but the nature of the “post” is not clear.\textsuperscript{48} Therefore, until 1951 Monyul or “the Tawang Tract” was virtually not under the direct administration of the GOI, since 1914 definitive border treaty was signed between then GOT and British India. In between, in 1946, NEFT was renamed, as NEFA, where Monyul was named the “Sela Sub Agency” from “the Tawang Tract” under the “Balipara Frontier Tract”, with headquarters at Charduar. In the same year, the Political Officer of the “Tract”, I. Ali, toured the region and submitted his report to the GOI.

However, we do not know how effective the formation of the “Sela Sub Agency” actually was, because Ali states that the measure of rule and taxation collected by the Dirang rdzong dpon was still effective in the report.\textsuperscript{49} It was again reported in 1947 up to Kalaktang, thus, in 1948 Richardson (1998 [1945]: 591) had a discussion with the “Tibet Foreign Bureau” on the border.\textsuperscript{50} Subsequently, China’s declaration to “liberate” Tibet in 1949, and occupation up to Chamdo in 1950 led to the GOI’s “Border Defence Committee” to recommend a “pushing forward the post to Tawang” (Chakra 1953: 35). Therefore, on 10\textsuperscript{th} December 1950, Joint Secretary to the GOI informed the “Advisor” of the Government of Assam that “we should effectively occupy it.” The matter was taken seriously under the Governor of Assam with the help of the “Adviser” N.K. Rustomji in 1951, which asked Major R. Khating\textsuperscript{51} to lead a column of Assam Rifles with eight “instructions” to implement the 1914 Simla Convention’s spirit.\textsuperscript{52}

Although it took nearly four decades for the GOI to fully assert a direct administration in the region, the change of regime took place between the Assam Rifles Major R. Khating and the last Tibetan administrator - Bla gnyer Thub bstan chos ’phel (r. 1949-51) at Tawang monastery was successful.\textsuperscript{53} The latter was locally called gnyer tshang, to whom Khating states that “the Nyertsang or Accountant of the monastery, who is Deputy from Lhasa may become the only thorn in the administration of the monastery in future, [and notes that] he is cunning and well informed” (Chakra 1953: 36). Indeed, his return to Central Tibet in early 1951 marked the change of regime, while Major Khating had accompanied three Monpa representatives from Tawang “to express to His Excellency [Governor of Assam] their gratitude” at Shillong in 1951.\textsuperscript{54} Since then, Monyul’s two districts were not left untouched by the GOI and they steadily developed over the last six decades.\textsuperscript{55}

Moreover, the autonomous status enjoyed by the chieftains who signed the 1844 and 1853 treaties is significant to the presently ongoing Sino-Indian “border talk”. The specific status reflects an Indo-Tibetan border, because it became the
base for the British India to keep the region under their observation, which continued under the GOI from 1947. Except the early 1949 document issued by the “Tibetan Assembly” (bod ljongs tshogs ’du), which theoretically objected to the “construction of road” and “entry of the outsider [Indian] from A smar ta’ la (Amatulla)”,56 there was not any further objection raised at the political level. At same time, Tsona rdzong dpon “entered our territory [Tawang] without previous permission”, and on formality ground an objection was lodged in April and September 1951 to Khating (Chakravarty 1953: 38). Khating states that the Tsona rdzong dpon objected to Khating’s “annexing” of Monyul in their formal meeting, and later upon requests by the Tsona rdzong dpon, he had given them the last and only “written reply” on 27th April.57 It was further rejected on 2nd September 1951, which was the last possible objection raised by the Tsona rdzong dpon to Khating (1951b). However, it is not known what is stated in that “written reply” given by Khating. It could be probable that the privileges were offered, if they—the Tsona rdzong dpon stayed back in Monyul. Since then, no further objection was raised by the GOT. Thus, the peaceful incorporation of Monyul into the union of Indian states was a gradual process. As briefly mentioned before, the last Tibetan official, Thub bstan chos ’phel (1988) accepted the change of situation in February 1951 and left to Lhasa within some weeks after then. The remaining (Tibeto-) Mon officials of the “Council of Four/Six/Seven” (bzhi/ drug/ bdun sbrel) filed [“acceptance cum] requisition” to the GOI, which was endorsed by the newly appointed “Assistant Political Officer” of the “Sela Sub Agency” in July 1952.

The new agreement reiterated the rights of the defunct Tawang officials, and where the “requisition” was partially based on the 1844 and 1853 treaties and the 1680 edict issued by the fifth Dalai Lama. Probably, it was the last time that they were exercising their autonomous status in their history. And the 1952 document records it being part of the Union of Indian states by the [“acceptance cum] requisition” to the Asst. Political Officer, who represents the GOI. Thus, the Water-Dragon year (chu’brug) document marks an important point in comparison to the “17th Point Agreement” document of 1951. The only difference between the two documents is that the latter was forced to be “signed and accepted,” while the former was [“acceptance cum] requisition” to maintain the status quo of the social-political system of their respective regions. Therefore, the former is intact, but changed gradually in the last sixty years, while the latter was abolished completely by the People's Republic of China in 1959. However, it is to be noted that historically Monyul is known to British India since 1844 and 1853 at the imperial to chieftainship level, which proves crucial to Monyul being “legally” incorporated into Indian nation-states in 1914 at the international level, and in 1952 at the national level.
With the “official declaration” of the Simla Convention on 3rd July 1914, but without the “agreement” of the Chinese representatives, scholars consequently argued that the McMahon Line was illegal or would fall out of legal validity. Nevertheless, the spirit of the Simla Convention on the Indo-Tibetan border has been effective since 1914. Although the 1962 Sino-Indian border war on the Eastern Himalayas was caused by tensions over the McMahon Line. However, it was not due to the legality of the 1914 Simla Convention. In fact, the war was caused by the closed-door “forward policy” of the GOI and the political stagnation of China. If the war was due to the line, I think it is not necessary for China to respect it until 1962, and also withdraw back after one month of occupation in the same year. Furthermore, the border war was fought on the India’s western sector, where the McMahon Line is not applicable. Thus, it is to state that the McMahon Line has been theoretically and practically accepted as the Indo-Tibetan border since 1914, where it is currently known as Sino-Indian border.

Amended Tibetan Text with Annotated Translation of the 1952 Document

Title ('bru tsha script)

An auspicious endorsement given by the Government of India to the three [traditional] domains of the Tawang monastery: the lands, the houses and the subjects.

1. གཤེགས་ཐོབ་དང་ལེགས་ཐོབ་ལེགས་པའི་ལོང་སྡོད་ཐོབ་མོ་གྲོས་ལོང་སྡོམ་པའི་དགའ་པོ་
2. འབྲུག་པར་བལ་བ་པ་ཞུས་དཔོན་ལོང་སྡོམ་པའི་དགའ་པོ་

Here is a concise [acceptance cum] requisition presented by us, the Tawang Monastery [officials] at the respected “great Indian Commissioner,” whose method [of rule] is perfect, glorious and exalted.
Previously, the Government of Tibet has looked after our virtuous monastery gracefully as being [located] at the border [and] we were not left to any other challenges. Since the great fifth Dalai Lama, the priest-patron relationship is [like] the union of sun and moon. [Therefore,] a precious edict was conferred,\(^6^3\) which is principally [as follows]: “all those nomads in the upper [valleys] and settled [subjects] in the lower [valleys]; the pastureland for the three—the horses, cattle, and sheep; the compilation of obligatory monkhood; an exception to the taxation (tshugs) after monkhood; the activities of religious and regulations by the abbot and the monastic office; the maintaining of laws, the collection of grains, and the collection of [taxed] loads by the manager; the renovation of the Tawang monastery and the Orgyan gling temple by the general people of Mon; however, the renovation of the commune-house, the grains-house, the store-room, the manager-house, the monk’s quarters, the main-door and boundary wall must be done by the respective subjects; the right to the subjects’ descendants of male and female; the ownership to the land and estate offered by some faithful sponsors and to be allowed to some accustomed services to the monastery. All these are to be maintained as what is till now; and it is precise to the established purview, which is to be remained intact as the given edict (thi’u).” [Therefore,] accordingly, it is very grateful that the fruitful auspicious order to be retained, [and] not to be altered, [but] will keep to the traditional ways of collection whether it is large or small amount of income for the monks for the religious activity.
Usually, we, the Tawang monastery performed regular prayer service to all for the glorious happiness in the region. For such a large scale prayer offering, the continuous funding is aimed [through taxation]: the land and estate [and] its animals, and the subjects’ descendant male and female in the [village] called Sog ma steng in Shar _tscho_ [region];

64 the land and estate received through the means of privacy and requisition of Dpa’ bo gdung [House] Shar _tscho_;

65 some lands and the subjects’ descendants of A’u gdung;

66 the nomads in the upper [valleys] and settled [subjects] in the lower [valleys] as recorded according to the Rgyang mkhar family’s edict;

67 the land and field, and nomads in Dwags pa sku gdung [region];

68 the estate and some fields of the monastery and the taxes of ‘Gro mgon sman snying Lama at Dkor sa dge khongs retreat site;

69 some lands and fields, the subjects’ descendants [and] the taxes of Mo mang Lama;

70 some lands and fields, [and] the taxes of Shag ti Lama;

71 some lands and fields, [and] the taxes of Kha rong Lama;

72 the jurisdiction [and] taxation of Stag lung Lama;
taxation and some lands and fields, [and] the subjects’ descendants of Nam gzhi Lama; the lands and fields, [and] taxes of Skyid gnas Lama; the jurisdiction, taxation, and the monk taxation, [and] some lands and fields of Mthong smon Lama; some lands and fields of Brag dkar Lama; the taxation, and oil taxes, some lands and fields, [and] the subjects’ descendants of Ar rgya gdung Lama; the monastery and its objects, both the public [and the monastery’s] land and field of Khron steng Lama; some lands and fields, [and] the few subjects’ descendants of Zhal rmang Lama and Gtsang po Lama; [and] some lands and fields, and the few subjects’ descendants of O rgyan gling Lama.

[Thus, through these sources] a vast and profound “feast and monetary offering” (gtong sgo) is presented [to the monk of the Tawang monastery]. [Not only the above mentioned,] it is also the subjects’ descendants, some lands [and] fields, jurisdiction, [and] taxation of Sla nga steng Monastery.

Furthermore, the following is the list of purchased estates as recorded in the ownership agreement letter: a house in thorny area of some nomads’ region of Sbrang nang; a house in Hram pa area; a house in Na ga zem bu; a house in Sra las steng; a house in Rin chen; a house in Bsam yag; a three-fold weaved water-field in Gsang rdi; a field at Ri tshong in Rdi rang; a field in Khye rma; a barley
field in Sli ‘ung; a field in the top of Nags ri [area]; a field in Mu rum; [and] the land and estate offered to the Tawang monastery by the childless- the father Lama Rin chen and the mother Rdo rje lha mo of Nam gzhi, when they were about to die due to age and sickness. [However,] presently, a family called Padma grags pa and Rdo chos grol had occupied the house as resident, [and] some existing estates, such as land and field, etc. in Pha zhu thang and Zor rgyab have been owned by them through self-claim. However, actually, they must now be allowed to be owned by the owner of the estates, as all these had been confirmed through the successive sponsors’ offerings.

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[With regards] to the activities at the Eastern [region], among those necessary to go: the two [lay and ordained] Stag lung rdzong dpon; the two [lay and ordained] Dirang (sdi rang) rdzong dpon; the two [lay and ordained] officials’ traders; one land tax official; one respected elder as [representative] of the [three] tshos; one trader from [Tawang] “Abbot Residence” (bla brang); and the two traders from storeroom [office]. As they have to travel every year, therefore, according to the registered precedent in the record-book, the taxation and corvee ('u lag) are [requested] to be propelled and pursued [to the subjects], because there leads to a steady decline in the offering to the Tawang monastery. It is, because in between due to ineffectiveness of one’s own [official in the region], the sources through taxation and corvee ('u lag) of Rdi rang rdzong and Stag lung rdzong broke down. Thankfully, from now on it is requested to consider restoring the earlier status. Furthermore, [it is requested to continue] the tradition of every third year [the Tawang monastery’s] abbot east to west Mon travelling and bestowing initiation and teaching, known as “religious campaign cum begging” (sgar skor) and [also] receiving some initiation fee as offering. The custom of receiving a hundred and fifty “silver coins” (dngul Tam) from [a family] called Byams gling bdag dod in Lha’u tsho. The continuous beneficiaries to consumption and expenditure of the existing “milk products” (nor phyug) from the summer nomads at pilgrim site called Bang ga byang ga, [and] the [nomads of] Khye brang smang, Zam snab, Don g Zhu rmang, Gnam steng, La nges sa, Chom chag li, Chu shod, Stong pa khang, Gdung chen mo, Glang dkar po, Gzhu khang, Snogo sha, Me tog tsang, Wang wi ra, [and] Gnas khang gling. The [continuation of this] concerned subject, who traditionally offered the necessary tea and noodles for the precious bka’ ’gyur recitation, when the two houses in a nomad place called “dead-stone” (rdo shi) relocated in Byang yul region, [and] also during grazing at the region’s pastureland, the solstice of the sun and moon in summer and winter of every year.
As there are successive “reincarnated lamas” (sprul sku) in the “Lama Residence” (bla brang) of Sag steng, Sa rong, Rdo les, [and] Lha rgya, the offering given [to them] on the basis of sacred teacher-disciples, [the] rights on the land and fields, and pasture and waters, which are virtuous and useful, the subjects’ descendants of male and female, [and] some usual tribute and corvee (‘u lag) are requested never to be changed, but to be remained as before. It is not necessary to say that the felling of timber for house-building, fire-wood and bamboo to be continued and not to be left as an [useless] “groove of trees’ region” (sul gling) in the woodland of the every villages. The onetime annual toll-taxes [collected] for the movement of the goats and sheep of Sbrang nang and Dag pa nang regions for [the reason of] pasture nourishment and the pasture-tax [collected] from some nomads are, from now on, no more needed to be distributed and received. Thus, it is requested to remain an intake forever, regardless of highest importance, whether it is clearly mentioned or not.
Besides that last year, a representative of the general council of Dag pa nang tsho, representing the old “chief of Dag po” (dag zhal), who owns successive generations of land, fields and subjects, is being at the edge of extinction of his lineages, arrived here. As the old spouse, who is about to die had left a will on property, land and fields, and it is not proper that [these belongings] should go waste to others; [therefore,] it is to be accepted for the religious offering of the [Tawang monastery, and] will be managed in order to be maintained. [For] this, there exists a separate offering agreement. As long as she is alive, she will be provided rations according to the prescribed officials’ notes and will not be left in impoverishment, and when she is dead, gradually, as per the instructions in her wills, the property, land and fields will not be left to go waste to others, [but] will be meted-out as per agreement.

Hence, at the present it is requested to have a favourable view and issue a precious auspicious official order. A requisite filed on the 17th day of the 8th month of the Water-Dragon [year].

**Conclusion**

As discussed in the paper, the decision of British India to incorporate Monyul region was primarily based on a strategic reason, but at same time, the final demarcated line demonstrates that British India respected the customary boundary between Tibet and the local indigenous people. The line is not entirely based on the so-called “water-shed” theory, which is extensively referred. In the end, both parties had respected the demarcated line by the time information and clarifications were exchanged in the 1940s, and after the change of regime on both sides. Additionally, the 1952 “[acceptance cum] requisition” document had practically solved and closed the quandary about Monyul’s status. However, nowhere in the document does it acknowledge the continuation or resumption of “compensation” (posa) amount of 5,000 Rupees, which date back to the 1833 and 1853 treaties. It seems that the posa was also resumed, soon after the signing of the 1952 document, which is legitimate to this day. Since then, the region is practically administered by the GOI, where presently it is formed into two separate districts within the state of Arunachal Pradesh.

Thus, presently, this region is divided into Tawang and West Kameng districts, after the bifurcation of the undivided “West Kameng district” (1980-84) in October 1984. The latter was carved out of the “Kameng Frontier Division” (1954-80), headquarters at Bomdila since 1951. Prior to that, it was called the “Sela Sub Agency” (1946-54) and “the Tawang Tract” (1919-46), where it was theoretically administered as the “Balipara Frontier Tract,” headquarters at Charduar, Assam. These two districts are one of the multi-ethnic regions within the state itself. In the region Monpa, a homogeneous term referring to different speakers of ‘Brog pa, Phyug pa, Dag pa, Rlis pa, Tibetan and Tshang la along with some other ethnic groups called
Aka (Hrusso), Bugun, Miji and Sherdukpen are living. Since the Simla Convention of 1914, the 24th State of Arunachal Pradesh was gradually transformed from a “section” into a “Tract”, and in turn became an “Agency”, an “Union Territory”, and finally a state.

Appendices

Appendix I

The English Notes on the McMahon Line, March 1914

A. McMahon to the Lonchen Shatra, 24 March 1914

To
Lonchen Shatra
Tibetan Plenipotentiary

In February last you accepted the India-Tibet frontier from the Isu Razi Pass to the Bhutan frontier, as given in the map (two sheets), of which two copies are herewith attached, subject to the confirmation of your Government and the following conditions:

(a) The Tibetan ownership of private estates on the British side of the frontier will not be disturbed.
(b) If the sacred places of Tso Karpo and Tsari Sarpa fall within a day’s march of the British side of the frontier, they will be included in Tibetan territory and the frontier modified accordingly.

I understand that your Government have now agreed to this frontier subject to the above two conditions.

You wished to know whether certain dues now collected by the Tibetan Government at Tsona Jong and in Kongbu and Kham from the Monpas and Lopas for articles sold may still be collected. Mr Bell has informed you that such details will be settled in a friendly spirit, when you have furnished him with the further information, which you promised.

The final settlement of this India-Tibet frontier will help to prevent causes of future dispute and thus cannot fail to be of great advantage to both Governments.

Delhi
(Signed) A. H.
MCMAHON, British Plenipotentiary.
B. The Lonchen Shatra to McMahon, 25 March 1914 (Translation)

To
Sir Henry McMahon,
British Plenipotentiary to the China-Tibet Conference

As it was feared that there might be friction in future unless the boundary between India and Tibet is clearly defined, I submitted the map, which you sent me in February last, to Lhasa for orders. I have now received orders from Lhasa, and I accordingly agree to the boundary as marked in red in the two copies of the maps signed by you subject to the conditions, mentioned in your letter, dated the 24th March, sent to me through Mr Bell. I have signed and sealed the two copies of the maps. I have kept one copy here and return herewith the other.

Sent on the 29th day of the 1st Month of the Wood-Tiger year (25th March 1914) by Lonchen Shatra, the Tibetan Plenipotentiary.

Seal of the
Lonchen Shatra

Appendix II

Amended “Tibetan Notes on the McMahon Line” with Annotated Translation

[Translation in Tibetan script]
This is in regards to how the British [Indo]-Tibetan boundary was demarcated. At first British India’s Government through [Charles] Bell Sahib, give us a map showing from Dzayul to the lower part of Kongpo and then, another map from Dakpo-Kongpo to Tsona Dzong, saying that this map is the continuation of the previous map. [He] said that the ultimate aims is not to have any conflict over the border between British [India] and Tibet. Thus, the differences are to be decided now and also to be observed further whether it is possible or not. In the demarcated line, Tsari Sarpa, Tso Karpo, etc. and a vast region of Tawang, etc. from Tsona is also included. He points finger to the region and reasons how this Tibetan became part of British India, but it is not decided until the Government of Tibet did not order the demarcation of the British [Indo]-Tibetan border to be so. After having thorough discussion on the pros and cons on the dimension of the “three [borders] in actual, lost and visual,” a border line was drawn. It was based upon after much area is drawn back [as claimed in the map]. The region, like Bathang, Lithang and Mili are not granted as per wishes of the British [India] Government, but nothing was left not to be considered heartily. Finally, it is said that British [India] Government will continue to support Tibetan, but still in whatever cases demarcation is necessary. Therefore, it is also said that Tibetan side also needed to consider deliberately, [because] British India continuously repeated the [importance of] demarcation.
Generally, Foreigner [British India] were currently powerful and systemic to their works, and opponents are losing to their steady development. Hence, it is needed to give [this region], because presently Tibet is in opposition to China; and we look for our temporary satisfaction to the British India’s Government, as [given the example of] sometime the fatal poisonous turned into a medicine. Therefore, there aroused number of differences from every part to annex land and its subjects. At that time, a treaty was signed between Russia and Mongolia; I think it was mainly for the Russian greedy. Thus, this act leads upon one to compete against the second. Upon my reflection to those, I requested that [the Government of Tibet] should slightly consider on the border of Mon’s side. Therefore, in order to not to have further great tasks to be done by the Indian representative, Sngam grol mkhan chung was requested and dispatched to hold discussion and research in the country [Tibet]. Upon his successful returning, the line was prepared on the treaty’s [map] of the three nations of China, Tibet and British [India]. Later on, the line was drawn red on the map as a boundary between British [India] and Tibet, and it was signed.

Thus, based upon letter given by the British [India]’s Foreign Minister, the followings are agreed: all the usual spiritual sources income will be remained intact to the private [estate], and of Mon [region, but] governmental taxation [from now on] will goes to British [India]; if any Tibetan citizen, etc. falls into the British [India] side, one will not be accepted; and the sacred pilgrimage site as Tso Karpo and Tsari Sarpo will be reversed back to Tibet side, where if it falls within one day distances; and [finally], the routine collection of toll tax from the people of Mon and “Klo pa” can be settled at the mutual understanding.
Thus, the plenipotentiaries of British [India] and Tibet exchanged letters (= notes) on the Indo-Tibetan border.\footnote{117}

As you had stated that the Government of Tibet had confirmed the two maps given to them in recent month of February, which demarcated the Indo-Tibetan border from the Isu Razi Pass\footnote{118} to the Bhutan frontier, it will be now based on the following notes:

a. If any Tibetan citizen, etc. falls into the British [India] side, British India will not confiscate and impound his rights.\footnote{119}

b. The sacred pilgrimage site as Tso Karpo and Tsari Sarpa will be in Tibet side, where, if it falls within one day distances.

It is confirmed what you have heard that the Government of Tibet is happy with the above two conditions. Thus, I will be much delighted if you could kindly acknowledge yours confirmation.\footnote{120}
A concern was raised by you, whether it is allowed to collect toll tax from Monpa and Klo pa who came to Tsona, Kongpo and Kham for trades. In that regards, as you had informed us that [Charles] Bell had been briefed details about the case. Thus, when he will talk those details to us, through mutual understanding, we can settle those issues. A great advantage will come to the nations of British [India] and Tibet after the clear demarcation of the Indo-Tibetan border. It is presented on 24th date of the 3rd month of the year 1914 by the British Plenipotentiary, A. H. McMahon.

Thus, accordingly the collection of the toll tax on goods from Mon should continue as per the principle statements of the agreement. [Besides that] after a final settlement on the Sino-Tibetan border, the talk on [the Indo-Tibetan border] must resumed again.

Notes
1. The paper was presented at the conference of “Re-visiting Shimla Convention 1914,” on 12th May 2014, Shimla. It was organised by the Himachal Pradesh University in cooperation with Tibet Policy Institute, Dharamshala. I would like to thank the organisers, and feedback received on further improvement on this article. I am thankful to the suggestion and critical edition of the paper by Prof. Dr. Per K. Sørensen, Franz Xaver Erhard, Lesley Branagan, and Daniel Wojahn.

2. “The Tawang Tract” and “Sela Sub-Agency” are recorded in number of pre-1951 the English sources. See further in Lamb’s (1966: 294-305) writing on “the Tawang Tract.”


4. See facsimile map of the McMahon Line reproduced in the Ministry of External Affairs, GOI (1960) publication- Atlas of the Northern Frontier of India. It was reproduced again in the Royal Central Asian Journal, Jul.-Oct. 1963. However, Gutpa (1971: 537) regards that it was first published in 1940, in the Times Handy Atlas. See also Richardson (1962: 267-8) and Kolmas (1980: 177-84). The first official map of India showing the McMahon Line was published in 1950, India: Showing Political Divisions in the New Republic, and the second edition was published in 1954 as Political Map of India. Both are published officially by the Survey of India. However, the Chinese Government argues on the “traditional customary line”, which lies further down to the Assam border, but such is not conceptualized at local level. The publication of the “Exchange of Notes between the British and Tibetan Plenipotentiaries regarding the India-Tibet boundary dated the 24th and 25th March 1914 respectively,”
the “Convention between Great Britain, China and Tibet, dated 3rd July 1914,” and the “Anglo-Tibet Trade Regulations, 1914” in the Aitchison’s Treaties edition of 1929 [1938], which was clandestinely “inserted” to 1929 edition (pp. 34-41) had institutionalised the Simla Convention, and theoretically closed the border argument. Albeit it became a constant academic subject, where number of writings has been observed written on the subject since 1959, where this cannot be avoided in the present Sino-Indian relations.

5. Read further in the White Paper (1961). Caroe (1960: 307) agrees that the McMahon Line is legally valid, but British India failed to “bring the maps promptly into consonance with international agreement. He argues that the failure was largely due to the outbreak of war in 1914 just after the Simla Convention, and the departure of McMahon himself to Egypt.” However, more importantly, it was Lord Hardinge telegraphed on 12 November 1914 to the Assam Governor also. In that telegram, it states that any further action in the newly acquired boundary be “decided on your proposals until the grave preoccupations of the war have passed.” This dragged the issue upto 1936-38. It is cited in Lamb (1966: 561) from “PEF 1913/18, no. 4745/14, India to Assam, 12 November 1914.”

6. Quoted from the Prime Minister Chou En-Lai’s letter to the Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, which is reproduced in: White Paper (1959: 52-54).

7. See Peking Review 1962 (43: 10) and The Sino-Indian Boundary Question (1962: 27). Chinese President Yuan Shih-Kai had formerly agreed to the tripartite negotiations, which resulted the Simla Convention of 1913-14 on 5th June 1913. In the following years of 1915, 1916, and 1919, China “made a number of efforts to resume the Simla basis for negotiations” with British India, but did not materialize (Mehra 1972: 299).

8. See Aitchison (1931: 119; 122; 142; 148-9; 150; 154; 156-65) for a number of treaties signed with various chiefs of ethnic groups or tribes in Arunachal Pradesh in the 19th century.

9. It is quoted in Bose (1997: 120) from the “Foreign Political Proceedings (India), December 1873, Nos 42-43.” Read further in Bose (1997: 111-153) for the “Inner Line Regulation-1873” and the undefined “Outer Line”.

10. Captain G.A. Nevill and W.C.M. Dundas were respectively appointed in-charge of the “Tracts”. Shukla (2012: 411) states that “[Nevill] remained in the Tawang region from 1913 to 1928,” which he had wrongly assumed on Nevill posting in Balipara for the period.

11. It was formed after the introduction of the North East Frontier Administration Regulation, 1954, and named as the NEFA. Once
administered as “Excluded Ares” through the Governor of Assam as an agent to the President of India, it was brought under the MEA since 1954 and MHA since 1972.


13. See Aris (1980) annotated translation and background to the edict. Some sources noted that 1844 was the actual year for the region being part of India. However, it is not historically. The year 1844 marked with signing of the 1844 treaty to “relinquish” the territory rights over Kureapara duar and the start of receiving a compensation sum of Rs. 5000.00, which was paid yearly since then. However, the Chief Secretary of Assam, A. Botham in 1920s left a remark on the posa being paid to Tawang, which proceeds further to Lhasa; thus “Tawang being a dependency of Lhasa and Tibet being a dependency of China, we are in a way paying tribute to China for part of the Darrang District” (Reid 1942: 303). He supports what Captain Nevill had reported, that this posa must abolish, because it was given on “false pretences”. However, the uses of the term “false pretences”, might not have been used, if they had read the 1844 and 1853 treaties published in 1862, which was republished in 1892 and 1929 [1938] in Aitchison’s Treaties.

14. See Tenpa (forthcoming 2014) on the identities of the Tibetan officials and the treaties. English copies of the treaties are available in Aitchison (1929 [1938]).

15. See Tibetan and English “Notes” on the McMahon Line in the appendixes I and II, and further in Richardson (1998 [1945]), Bell (1924) and Mehra (1980: 78).

16. See Mehra (1974: 226-7) and Lamb (1966: 506). The negotiation on the Indo-Tibetan border in the Eastern Himalayas was finalised within three months, i.e. Jan.-Mar. 1914. Since Monpa and Sherdrukpen had their first officials contacts with British Indian in 1844, the first European to enter the lower part of Monyul as Nurigoon/ Narigoon (Rupregao= Rupa town) for four days was Schlagintweit (1857: 555) in 1856. He was accompanied by “former Rajah of Towang-Chang To” (see Tenpa forthcoming 2014) from Udalguri (see also Aris 1980: 16). After then, the British subject Nain Singh in 1874-5 (Trotter 1877: 118-121; 135-6); G.A. Nevill in 1912 (Nevill 1914); F.M Bailey and H. Morshed in 1913 (Bailey 1914b); F. Ludlow and G. Sherriff in 1934 (Ludlow 1936-38); G.S. Lightfoot in 1938 (Lightfoot 1938); F. Kingdon-Ward in 1935 and 1939 (Kingdon-Ward 1938) and F. Ludlow and K. Lumsden in 1936 (Ludlow 1936-38).

17. A well versed in Tibetan language, F. M. Bailey (1882-1967) was among the British India army to take part in the invasion of Tibet in 1904. In 1906
he got transferred to the Foreign and Political Department and became a famous explorer in the Southeast region of Tibet and present-day Arunachal Pradesh. Due to his sound knowledge on Tibetan language, his ethnographic data are informative and accurate. See further details in Lamb (1966: 536-7; 547-50) on decision to include Tawang, but excluding Tsona Dzong within the McMahon Line in the late 1913, and also Lonchen Shatra reaction and acceptance of the line.

18. Gait (1906) may have read the works of Aitchison (1892) Treaties, Mackenzie (1884), Pemberton (1839), and Robinson (1841). The last author notes that “this Duwar [Kuriapara duar] is held by the Towang [Tawang] Raja, a chieftain immediately dependent upon Lassa [Lhasa].” The wording is quoted more or less similar in the later writings of Gait (1906), Bailey (1914), Kennedy (1914), Kingdon-Ward (1938) and Reid (1942).

19. It is quoted from Mehra (1974: 226), which is based on “‘Office Note by McMahon, 12 November 1913’ of ‘Notes’ in ‘Foreign, September 1915, Procs. 76-101.’” However, this cannot be, because Lonchen Shatra was well aware of the inclusion of Monyul in the proposed line. Not only had that he even persuaded Lhasa to accept the line on the ground of British India being neighbour, and could be assistant in resolving Sino-Tibetan border. See further Bshad sgra’s (d. 1918) “Tibetan Notes” in the appendix II.

20. See the 1852 incident in Tenpa (forthcoming), and also in Mackenzie (1884), Aitchison (1929), Reid (1942) and Lamb (1966).


22. Lamb (1966: 301) states that at then Graham was the Deputy Commissioner of the Darrang district of Assam.

23. It is quoted in Lamb (1966: 301) from “Secret Letters from India (1873) vol. 15, f. 523.”

24. Elwin (1959: 353) stated that in 1876, Sherdukpen chieftains were invited to a ceremony held at Tezpur to make the Queen Victoria’s proclamation of being empress of India. The information source is not recorded and is not discussed in other sources.

25. While upto Walong in the far eastern modern Dibang and Anjaw districts had been acknowledged by Tibetan since early 20th century, which seems to be followed by Republic of China in 1912 (Lamb 1966: 365). Practically, it seems that Chinese officials were following the guidance
of Tibetan officials upon the traditional customary boundary. This shows that normally they do not cross the line. It is even observed that there did not occur any arms conflict in compared to report of Ahkyang Valley, a border between Burma and Yunnan, China, where J. Barnard was injured in the cross-firing, a leader of the British expeditions in 1913 (Lamb 1966: 359).


27. It is quoted in Lamb (1966: 455) from “PEF 1913/40, no. 916/13, Jordan to Grey, 6 March 1913.”


29. See the “Exchanges of notes of 24/25 March 1914” in Appendix I (A and B). The “notes” is first published in Aitchison (1929 [1938]: 34-5). It is also not stated in the “Tibetan Notes”, see Appendix II. See also Chakravarty (1953: 18-19), White Paper (1962: 10-17), Rao (1962: 405) and Lamb (1966: 563-5).

30. Miri stands to the rest of Arunachal Pradesh region, excluding the districts of Tawang and West Kameng. See Military Reports (1920) quoted in Reid (1942: 280-1) and Lamb (1966: 534).

31. A similar observation is stated, as “aggressions of Chao Erh-feng, and Chinese infiltration into the border regions on the North and North East of India, had made it desirable to secure a definite boundary with Tibet; as a result of the negotiation as agreed line was defined in a map, fixing the boundary” (Richardson 1998 [1945]: 546).


33. See the map in Lamb (1966: 535). It is modified and reproduced here as map no. 1.

34. Bell (1946: 206) reiterated this more openly in 1946, and see Kolmas (1980: 177-84) also.

35. See Lamb (1966: 339-40; 352). The thirteenth Dalai Lama and his Government-in-Exile (1910-13) did inform Charles Bell in 1911 that Tibetan have jurisdiction over some region. Nevertheless Bell regarded that “it is not desirable that matters regarding the Abors, Mishmis and...
other tribes on the North-East Frontier should be discussed with the Dalai Lama and his Ministers” at all. It is quoted in Lamb (1966: 351) from “FO 371/1065, no. 35166, Bell to India, 5 August 1911, and India to Weir, 15 August 1911.”

36. The status of the Tibetan Plenipotentiary: “I [the 13th Dalai Lama] hereby authorise Srid ’dzin (Ruler [Prime Minister]) Sha-tra Paljor Doji [bshad sgra dpal ’byor rdo rje] to decide all matters that may be beneficial to Tibet and I authorise him to seal all such documents.” There are different dates on the passing away of Lonchen Shatra, where Bell (1924) notes before 1920; while Petech (1973: 183) regards 1919, and Shakabpa (1967: 262) states 1923. Lonchen Shatra’s grandson Bshad sgra Dga’ ldan (1992: 69) states that he passed away in 1918, which is closed to Bell and Petech observation. See the history of Shatra (bshad sgra) family in Bsha sgra Dga’ ldan (1992: 1-225) and Petech (1973: 159-85), and the concerned Lonchen Shatra in Shakabpa (1967: 252-7) and Bshad sgra Dga’ ldan (1992: 52-70).

The Chinese Government initial status says: “it has become the duty of this Government of China to order the said Plenipotentiary to proceed to India, there to negotiate a provisional treaty jointly with the Plenipotentiary appointed by Great Britain and the Tibetan Plenipotentiary, and to sign articles which may be agreed on in order that all difficulties which have existed in the past may be dissolved” (Lamb 1966: 473). British did not object to the line “a provisional treaty”.

37. See the notes in the Appendix I (A and B) and the amended and annotated translation of the “Tibetan Notes” in Appendix II. See also Lamb (1966: 506-90) understanding of the Indo-Tibetan boundary treaty. The “25th March note” in English of Lonchen Shatra is not recorded in the Tibetan text. Coincidently Captains Nevill and Kennedy arrived Dirang Dzong on 23rd March 1914 and on 1st April, they reached Tawang after their initial expedition to the Aka Hills. See Nevill’s (1914) report as “PEF 1913/28, no. 3461/14, Nevill to Assam, 21 June 1914,” quoted in Reid (1942: 283-7) and Lamb (1966: 561).

38. See Appendix II of the “Tibetan Notes.”

39. Shukla (2012: 409) notes that the Tibetan authorities “did little to buttress their colonial rule over the Buddhist areas around Tawang and Mechuka.” However, this is not correct, because it was probably his assumption, and also he did not refer and cite any Tibetan language sources for further examination. Moreover, he did not consult any Tibetan language archives from the region. However, Nevill might have reached Rupa and met their chieftains called “Satrajas” either in Rupa or Charduar or Udalguri.
40. Nevill’s report is quoted in Reid (1942: 291-294). However, there are some differences in the word, where “early” is quoted in Mehra (1972: 305), Shukla (2012) and others, while Reid (1942: 293) stated “easy”. See Kingdon-Ward’s (1938: 610-19) critical views on the Government’s policy on not administrating the region. Some of his strong worded seems to be towards his imprisonment in Tawang by (Tibeto-) Mon officials in 1935 and from the “Great Game” intoxication.

41. See Reid (1942: 294-5) for the official letter. Although Russia was well aware of the Simla Convention from the beginning and the final result on 11th July 1914, British India could not publish the Simla Convention despite reviewing it in 1920 and 1928. Until 1924, it was the “self-denying ordinance in Tibet” of the 1907 Convention between Russia and British. Although, it was ‘formally cancelled’ by Article II of the Anglo-Russian Treaty of the 7th Aug. 1924; however, until 1938 British India did not publish the Simla Convention, because British India did not want China “to take overt notice of it, and so afford a fresh handle for anti-British propaganda.” It is quoted in Mehra (1972: 304) from “India to 10 May 22, 1928, in IOR, L/PandS/10/1192.”

42. It is quoted in Mehra (1972: 306) from “Coroe to Walton (India Office), April 9, 1936, in IOR, L/PandS/12/36/12.”

43. See Addis (1963), Lamb’s (1966: 546) notes and Mehra (1972: 299) on two versions of the edition. In early 1920, the Foreign Office in London was eager to publish the Simla Convention, but the Secretary of State for India declined to do, because to “not to give unnecessary publicity to the provisional arrangements of 1914.” Quoted in Mehra (1972: 303) from “IO to FO, March 8, 1920, Proc. 135 Foreign, External B, May 1920.” See further in Mehra (1972) how and why the Simla Convention was “inserted” and published finally in 1938. Mehra argues that Nanking, then capital of China strong worded protest against the “Protocol of Mutual Assistance” to the signed agreement between the Soviet Union and Mongolia “felt concerned” to the India Office in London and New Delhi, which led to act on the Simla Convention.

44. Lamb (1966: 518) considers that “Tibeto-British agreement on the boundary in the Assam Himalayas” as secret, but not necessarily a legal issue.

45. See the how the decision was reached to dispatch Captain Lightfoot’s expedition to Tawang in Reid (1942: 295-7).

46. Captain G.S. Lightfoot was the Political Officer of the “Balipara Frontier Tract”, headquarters at Charduar. In 1946, it was divided into “Sela Sub Agency” and “Subansiri Hills”. See Lightfoot (1938) for further details.
47. In 1943, Mills was told by the (Tibeto-) Mon officials that “they could not find the papers about the [Simla] Convention, [which Mill interpreted] what they really meant was that if we had forgotten the boundary for over twenty-nine years we could go on forgetting about it altogether” (Mills 1950: 154).

48. Richardson (1998 [1945]: 639) has not given any sources on the posts establishment, which is quoted similarly in Chakravarty (1953: 35). However, Charkravarty (1953: 58-9) in appendices I and II note that an “outpost” were established since 1939 in Kuriapara Duar/ Bhairabkunda and Seijesa, 1941 in Rupa and 1944 in Dirang Dzong and But valleys. However, besides the records of “a Tibetan Agent” or “one Assistant Tibetan Agent,” no nature of the military staffs is recorded. A permanent full force military was likely to be posted after 1951.

49. See Ali (1946). Richardson (1998 [1945]: 639) states that Tibetan officials in 1942-3 “entered Sherdukpen country and collected taxes; this called forth a protest from the Government of India.”

50. See the summary in Chakravarty (1953: 31; 33).

51. Major Ralengnao Khating (1912-1990) rejoined the Indian Army - the second Assam Rifles in 1950 as Asst. Commander at the “Sadiya Frontier Tract” and was soon promoted to Asst. Political Officer of the “Tirap Frontier Tract.” He was on special deputation to the “Abor Hill Frontier Tract,” when was summoned by then Governor of Assam (r. 1950-57) Jairamdas Daulatram (1891-1979) to a mission to “the Tawang Tract” or “Sela Sub Agency.” Prior to rejoining the Indian Army, Major Khating served as cabinet minister in the Chief Minister of the Manipur Maharaja’s Government, and was British Indian army since 1941 in various levels at the Hyderabad and the Assam Regiments. His contribution was acknowledged only after the 1954 “Pancheel Agreement,” where Monyul being taken over by the GOI was officially declared. For his successful incorporation of the region in 1951, he was recruited to the short-lived newly formed Indian Frontier Administrative Service (IFAS; 1956-1974) in 1957 and was also awarded Padma Shri in 1957. He was appointed the first Deputy Commissioner of the newly formed Mokokchung district of Naga Hills (Nagaland). Since then he was promoted in the successive years as NEFA’s Chief Security Commissioner (1962-67), the Nagaland’s Chief Secretary (1967-72) and the first Indian Ambassador (1972-75) to Burma (Myanmar) in 1972.

52. Refer Chakravarty (1953: 34-40) for the eight “instructions” in the officials document titled, “Secret: Notes on the Indo-Tibetan Relations,
from 1772-1951: With Special Reference to the McMahon Line.” See Khating report in the same document (p. 36) and Khating (1951a) “occupation of Tawang-Earthquake relief measures by Major Kathing.”

53. See the account of Thub bstan chos ’phel (1988: 24-43) in Tibetan. It is written on his posting and the function of the old Monyul administration. See also Ye shis ’phrin las (1983) and Bshad sgra (1991). Chakravarty (1953: 34-40) based on Khating’s report, identified Bla gnyer or Gnyer tshang to Tsona rdzong dpon, which was not correct and the misidentification is followed in numbers of later writings.

54. No records of who were the three representatives. Could Pema Gombu be one among them, who assisted Khating in 1951? See Shukla (2012: 413-15; 418-19) who had reproduced some pages of short description of Pema Gombu’s biography, which was written way back in 2008 and translated into English by his son.


56. It was around 1948-49. See the document no.1118_LTWA_329. It is dated Earth-Mouse [1949] and titled the “Great Tibetan Assembly’s [direction to the ‘Council of Four’ to stop the Outsider [Indian] from entering Monyul, issued on the 21st day of the 11th Month of the Earth-Mouse [1949] year, [and] received on the 8th day of the 12th Month [of the same Earth-Mouse [1949] year].” This could be likely the last decree issued by the Dga’ ldan pho brang GOT (1642-1959). See the document http://www.dtab.unibonn.de/tibdoc/php/t_show.php?dokid=1118.

57. Later, the Tsona rdzong dpon’ objection was discussed with the Tibet Foreign Bureau Office by the Indian Trade Agent at Yatong on 22nd March 1951 and again on 17th April 1951 (Murty and Bempong 1971: 361-2).

58. On early 3rd July 1903, McMahon received a telegram, stating that “His Majesty’s Government cannot authorise separate signature with Tibetans [alone],” but the British India and Tibet plenipotentiaries had signed and sealed the map attached to the Simla Convention and declared to abide by the terms of the Convention and also to the Trade Regulations. See further in Lamb (1966: 519) and “FO 371/1931, no. 30825, Secretary of State to Viceroy, 3 July 1914.”

59. The British Foreign Office had already consented to inform it to Russia on the initialled Simla Convention between British India, Tibet and China.
on 4th May. Thus, on the 17th May 1914, British Ambassador Buchanan had talked with the Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov. See the discussion in Lamb (1966: 509-16).

60. Noorani (2011: 171) without any sources states that the Tawang region has been “legally” part of India since 1919. See also the paper on Tawang after 1951 by Maxwell (1970) and Murty and Bempong (1971), etc.

61. See Henderson Brooks’ (1962) report and China’s domestic social and political chaos in those years.

62. In Tibetan it is “rgya gzhung spyi khyab chen po”. “Spyi khyab chen po” is a common term applied during the Dga’ ldan pho brang GOT (1642-1959) to a civil cum military official. As Major R. Khating was the Asst. Political Officer cum leader of the Indian army, he was addressed in the same manner. A “Spyi khyab chen po” is appointed in the rank of cabinet minister, and can make effective decision. As he was supposed to follow the eight “instructions”, it is not known whether Major Khating was empowered to make and take a certain decision beside annexation and winning the favour of local people and authorities of (Tibeto-) Mon officials to Indian officials. However, Major Khating did affix the stamp, but it is not known whether he understood the context of the text. Nothing is recorded about the issue in the report of Khating (1952a).

63. See Aris (1980) remarks and annotated translation of the 1680 edict.

64. Sog ma steng is located in Kitpi Circle Area of Tawang district. Shar tsho as Kitpi is used to be one of the major old administrative centre of Monyul. It consists of one “mayor” (gtso rgyan) position and was one of the three prime tshos of La’og yul gsum (Tawang). The other two tshos were Lha’u tsho and Bse ru tsho. See Tenpa and Tempa (2013: 37-8) for the list of tshos, which is based on the 1680 edict issued by the fifth Dalai Lama, Thub bstan chos ’phel (1988: 24-43) and Ye shes ’phrin las (1983: 132-63).

65. Dpa’ bo gdung House is located in Kitpi village of Kitpi Circle Area. It was once part of the traditional division of Shar tsho. Dpa’ bo gdung House was founded in the 16th century by Bsod bzang, the second elder brother to Blo bzang bstan pa’i sgron me. Its origin relies to Ber mkhar House. See further in Rgyal rigs (1986 [1728]: 31a) and Tenpa (2013: 12).

66. A’u gdung House is also located in Kitpi Cirle Area. It was founded by ’Dzom pa dbang, a fifth generations descendant to Jo bo Bkra shis dar rgyas- the eldest brother of Blo bzang bstan pa’i sgron me who continued the Ber mkhar House in the 16th century. ’Dzom pa dbang and Phun tshogs were born to Sangs rgyas grags pa. Phun tshogs founded the Lower Ber
mkhar House. Their great-granduncle Jo bo Dar rgyas, the paternal uncle to their father’s descendants were Karma rdo rje and Jo bo Sde pa. Jo bo Karma rdo rje founded the Upper Ber mkhar House and was the maternal grandfather of the sixth Dalai Lama Tshangs dbyangs rgya mtsho (1682-1707). See further in Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho (1989 [1703]) and the Rgyal rigs (1986 [1728]: 31a). The information on the maternal grandfather and Jo bo Sde pa confirms that Rgyal rigs text was compiled in 1728 as suggested by Aris (1986). He based it on a copy of a text available at the library of the Tibet House, New Delhi. This raises question on Ardussi’s (2009) re-calculation of the Rgyal rigs date, as 1668 instead of 1728.

67. I am not able to identify, which Rgyang mkhar family’s estate was attached to the Tawang monastery. There were at least three estates holder families, besides the chief residential fortress called Rgyang mkhar rdzong. Upto 1951, there used to be Rgyang mkhar rdzong dpon, who was appointed jointly by the “Council of Four” (bzhi sbrel) of Tawang Monastery and the Tsona rdzong dpon, the appointee would also hold the post of Seng ge rdzong dpon (Thub bstan chos ‘phel 1988: 24-43). However, in some British India’s sources, it recorded that Rgyang mkhar rdzong post was held jointly by the Tsona rdzong dpon, where the Rgyang mkhar rdzong was the winter residence of the Tsona rdzong dpon.

68. Dag pa sku gdung region is traditionally in Dag pa tsho brgyad, which presently comprises of Lumla, Bongkhar and Dudungkhar Circle Areas of Tawang district. Dag pa nang consists of eight tshos and was one of the traditional thirty-two tshos divisions of the Monyul region.

69. ’Gro dgon sman gling Lama and his Dkor sa dge khongs site is located nearby Jang village, in present day Jang Circle Area of Tawang district.

70. Mo mang Lama’s monastery is located nearby Lumla village in present-day Lumla Circle Area.

71. Shag ti Lama is of Shag ti Monastery in Shakti village, which is presently part of Lumla Circle Area.

72. Kha rong Lama’s monastery is not identified at the present moment.

73. Stag lung Lama’s monastery was once the Stag lung rdzong, where it used to be the chief residential cum administrative office of the Stag lung rdzong dpon. The original Stag lung rdzong cum monastery was not restored or renovated after the 1950 Earthquake in the Eastern Himalayas. A new monastic complex stands in front of the old site. The Stag lung rdzong dpon was primarily appointed from the “fully ordained” (dge slong) monks of the Tawang monastery. After the change of administration, the last
rdzong dpon became a Lama of the monastery, currently a lay-priest Rinchen was selected by the traditional villages, which once offered their tributes to the Stag lung rdzong. The present Kalaktang and Balemu Circle Areas of West Kameng district falls in the old rdzong’s administration. The founder of the Stag lung monastery traced to Lama Bstan pa’i sgron me, see further in Tenpa (2013).

74. Namshu/ Nam gzhi is one of furthest village in Monyul in the eastern direction. Nam gzhi Lama’s monastery is also considered being founded by Lama Bstan pa’i sgron me. It is located in Thembang Circle Area of West Kameng district.

75. Skyid gnas Lama’s monastery is traditionally regarded being founded by either the first Karmapa or the third Karmapa. See further in Tenpa and Tempa (2013: 7). It is located in Jang Circle Area of Tawang district.

76. Mthong smon Lama’s monastery is located in Thongmon village in the Kitpi Circle Area of Tawang district.

77. Brag dkar Lama’s monastery is Brag dkar dgon pa, which was founded by a 17th century local ‘Brug pa bka’ brgyud Lama. It is one among the number of joint sects’ monastic centres of Rnying ma, Bka’ brgyud and Dge lugs traditions in the region. It is located just above Lhou village in the Lhou Circle Area. Traditionally, it was administered under the Lha’u tsho’s gtso rgyan. See also Tenpa and Tempa (2013: 9).

78. Ar rgya gdung dgon pa is regarded being founded either by Lama Bstan pa’i sgron me or Gtsang ston Rol pa’i rdo rje, or jointly by them. It is located just above Lhou village in the Lhou Circle Area. Traditionally, it was administered by the Lha’u tsho’s gtso rgyan. See further in Tenpa (2013), Tenpa and Tempa (2013: 9), Rgyal rigs (1986 [1728]) and Sarkar (1980).

79. Here, the Tibetan term “rten skor” is used, which is synonym to “’bum skor” and “yum ’khor” meaning “fields circumambulation ritual.”

80. Khron steng monastery is located in the western side of the Geshe la Mountain Ranges, which is opposite to Tawang valley. It is located in Kitpi Circle Area.

81. Zhal mang monastery is located in present-day Lumla Circle Area.

82. Gtsang po monastery is located within the Tawang town, but in the eastern most part. It is one among the number of joint sects’ monastic centres of Rnying ma, Bka’ brgyud and Dge lugs traditions in the region. History of this monastery traced to the late 15th century. See Tenpa and Tempa (2013: 14).
83. Orgyan gling is a monastic complex south to Tawang town of around two three km, is the birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama Tshangs dbyangs rgya mtsho. The original monastery is founded by U rgyan bzang po (15th-16th c.), the youngest brother of Padma gling pa (1450-1521) in 1488-89. The monastery was visited by Padma gling pa in 1489, when he attended his brother marriage to Rdo rje ’dzoms pa, the daughter of Rus po mkhar jo bo Don grub. See further in Padma gling pa (1975 [1521]: 114a). Also further in Tenpa and Tempa (2013: 10) and Aris (1979).

84. Sla nga steng monastery is regarded being founded by Lama Bstan pa’i sgron me. It is located in Dudungkhar Circle Area (?). See Tenpa (2013), and Tenpa and Tempa (2013: 9).

85. In the traditional thirty-two tshos division of, the present-day Dirang, Thembang and Bomdila Circle Areas of West Kameng district are called “the six tsho of Sbrang nang” (srang nang tsho drug). It consists of Seng ge rdzong/ Smyug ma gdung tsho, Phyug tsho, Rlis tsho, Sang rdi tsho, Rdi rang tsho and Nam gzhu/ Them spang tsho. See the table in Tenpa and Tempa (2013: 37-8).

86. All the mentioned areas are located in Dirang and Thembang Circle Areas of West Kameng district, excluding Senge Dzong and Nyukmadung valleys.

87. The activities were related to trades at Kuriapara duar in Udalguri. The activities areas are readable in the south, but the location being in the east tradition goes back to enormous historical narratives since mid-16th c. It is related to the “religious campaign cum begging” (sgar skor) in the “Eastern Mon” (eastern Bhutan and Monyul) recorded during those periods when a Lama visits this region. Thub bstan chos ’phel states that when he was in Tawang in 1949, he was not able to proceed further down to Amatulla to collect the posa for the last few years. It was probably since 1946 that the “activities in the Eastern” could not be continued and posa of 5000.00 rupees was not received until 1952 document was signed.

88. Theoretically, a lay and ordained rdzong dpon were appointed in usual norm, but sometimes there was only one or sometimes both the rdzong dpon were monks.

89. The phrase “one respected elder as [representative] of the [three] tsho” (tsho mi dge r gan geig) refers to a representative of the three tshos: Shar tsho, Lha’u tsho and Bse ru tsho out of thirty-two tshos of old Monyul administration. Gtso r gan of these tshos were represented in the core “Council of Four/ Six/ Seven” (bzhi/ drug/ bdun sbrel). Being geographically close to Tawang monastery and the some of the successive
descendants were called jo bo of Bse ru, Lha’u khams pa and Ber mkhar, they held an immense social and political dominion in the region since centuries ago. See Rgyal rigs (1986 [1728]: 35a-40b).

90. The discontinuation of taxation from the region might have occurred after Ali (1946) toured the region upto Dirang in 1946.

91. Unfortunately I was not able to trace the history of this Byams gling bdag dod.

92. All mentioned places are summer pasturelands for nomads in the north and south surroundings of Sela of the Sela Mountain Ranges. Sela is one of the numerous mountain pass, where “stiff” (ze) pass is called in local language. However, the Sela Mountain Ranges are mistakenly considered the natural boundary between Tawang and West Kameng. The assumption of Sela being the boundary between upper and lower Monyul dates back not further than 1913, and British India started to apply this geographically, since 1946. This was marked by posting first column of Assam Rifles for some months after then. This assumption led to the division of Monyul into Tawang and West Kameng districts in 1984, primarily based on Sela as natural boundary. It seems more grounded on the geo-strategic reason, because British India nearly decided to reconsider the inclusion of the present Tawang district in 1944 back to Tibet (Murty and Bempong 1971).

93. Present Jang Circle Area of Tawang district falls on the ancient trade-route. The town is now the second biggest after Tawang town.

94. It is commonly regarded that these four were traditional jewels of the “Eastern Mon”, but Sag steng is no more in Monyul. It is incorporated as Merak and Sakteng gewok of Trashigang district in the Eastern Bhutan. The remaining, three person has been revered as the “three great person of Mon” (mon gyi skyes bu gsum) in Bstan ’dzin nor bu (2002: 270-84) and Tenpa and Tempa (2013: 14). Traditionally, the successive lineages of these Lamas are selected within the region. The last Lha rgyal la Rinpoche passed away in 2013.

95. See note 68.

96. It is the only case, where further tributes were decided not to receive. However, no reason is given, why it has decided to forgo this tribute from these two regions on animal toll-taxes.

97. In Tibetan, bza’ dman tshe gang gnas ’jag.

98. See Tenpa (forthcoming) paper on the 1844 and 1853 treaties and the posa.

99. Refer the official websites of both districts at: www.tawang.nic.in and www.westkameng.nic.in.
100. East Kameng was the other district formed in 1980 from the “Kameng Frontier Division”.

101. See Chakravarty (1953: 59), where he notes that “in 1946, on administrative grounds, Balipara Frontier Tract was divided into two separate districts viz- Se-La Sub-Agency and Subansiri Area.” He did not write anything on the “the Tawang Tract.” See also Ali (1946), a 2012 declassified file.

102. See Gohain’s (2012) paper on the language in the current political scenario.

103. See Bodt (2012: 313-40) on various linguistic groups belonging to East Bodish language family of the Tibeto-Burman languages.

104. See Aitchison’s Treaties (1929 [1938]: 34-35) the “Exchange of notes between the British and Tibetan Plenipotentiaries regarding the India-Tibet boundary, dated the 24th and 25th March 1914, respectively.” It is also quoted in White Paper (1961), Lamb (1966: 618-19) and Mehra (1974: 231) from “File No. 231(a) in Foreign, October 1914, Procs. 134-396.”

105. The original map, in eight miles to the inch scale was first published in “An Atlas of the Northern Frontier of India,” published by the MEA, GOI, New Delhi in 1960. See note no. 4 for further details.

106. The “Tibetan Notes on the McMahon Line” is extracted from document titled, “shing stag sim la’i chings don yig cha (the document of the Wood-Tiger Simla Treaty [minutes of the Simla Convention in Tibetan]). The document is written in khyugs script, and its content one hundred thirty-four pages. The particular note is from pages one hundred thirty-one to thirty-four. The sub-title “the Tibetan Notes on the McMahon Line” is not stated in the document, rather I have formulated. The language and the information contains in the document indicates that it is written by first person, Lonchen Shatra (d. 1918) but it is not mentioned at all. However, this particular section is not fully written by Lonchen Shatra, rather it seems to be finally compiled by Khri smon Nor bu dbang rgyal (1897-1945), who was Lonchen Shatra’s deputies during the Simla Convention. However, the date is not given at all. In the last line of the text, it suggests that “the collection of the toll tax on goods from Mon should continue as per the principles statement of the agreement. [Besides that] after the final settlement of the Sino-Tibetan border, the talk on the [Indo-Tibetan border] must resumed again.” This leads me to assume that the document is probably finished in the year 1918, because the Sino-Tibetan border talk was assumed again after the end of the First World War. See the annotated English translation with the Tibetan text. The text will likely to fill the gap, where what Lamb (1966: 546) left a note that “very little
information on what actually took place during the Bell-Łońchen Shatra discussions.” I would like to thanks Chung Tsering, Tibetan Studies Lecturer at INALCO, Paris for his input on this document.

107. The presentation of the South-eastern Tibet region, from Dzayul to Tsona Dzong including Monyul is not mentioned in the English sources. However, the displayed map may be the one prepared by Bailey (1912: 347; 1914a: 361; 1914b: v). Does this indicate that Charles Bell on behalf of McMahon bargain from Dzayul including Kongpo, Dakpo and Tsona at the beginning. It seems so, because until the late 1913 Tsona was included in the proposed boundary line. See the map no. 1.

108. Tsari Sarpa (tsa ri gsar pa) and Tso Kar po (mtsho dkar po) are presently located in the West and Upper Siang(s) districts of Arunachal Pradesh state. These areas are now formed into Mechuka Circle Area in West Siang and Tuting and Gelling Circle Areas in Upper Siang.

109. Here, the “Tibetan” denotes to nation-state theoretical points and not to ethnic groups of Tibetan, Monpa, etc. Tibetan literature is quite clear in pointing Monpa as a different ethnic group. An ethnic group of Mon is not reserved in one region, but it is observed that it is applied from the western to eastern Himalayas. However, Monyul or “Southern Mon” (lho mon) or “Eastern Mon” (shar mon) are basically refer to the Eastern Himalayan region, including Sikkim, Bhutan and present-day Monyul.

110. The term “three [border] in actual, lost and visual” is translated from ma shor rnam gsum. Any better understanding than this translation is most welcome.

111. These regions belonging to the traditional Khams (mdo stod) province are currently located in the “Kardze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture” in Sichuan province and “Dechen Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture” in Yunnan province in China. However, these mentioned Khams areas had not been recorded being part of the British Indian primary demarcation line in the English sources. May be Charles Bell had orally stated or it was overblown by Lonchen Shatra.

112. This is quite interesting to note that British India was not taken fully assured by the Tibetan representatives. This could be the 1888-9, 1904 and 1911-13 relations with British India.

113. Sne mgron mkhan chung is spelled Shod mgron mkhan chung in page three of the document. He was one of the seven deputies came along with Lonchen Shatra. The other six were “the deputy Commander-in-Chief” (dmag spyi chung ba) Tha’i ji Khri smon Nor bu dbang rgyal, and the three representatives of the “three seats” (gdan sa gsum, = Se ra, ’Bras spung and Dga’ ldan), and the representatives of the ordained and lay
Secretariats (Bshad sgra d. 1918: 3). The title mkhan chung (mkhan drung chung ba) was reserved for the monk officials only. The three mkhan chung as deputy to mkhan che (mkhan drung che ba) were appointed in the office of the “ecclesiastical office” (yig tshang) as Mkhan drung (mkhan po’i drung yig). See Petech (1973: 7-14), Rahul (1989; 1969: 22-50) and Tenpa (2009) on the Dga’ ldan pho brang GOT.

114. See the facsimile map of the McMahon Line reproduced in the MEA, GOI (1960) publication - Atlas of the Northern Frontier of India. See further in note no. 4.

115. This line corresponds to the McMahon Line “Notes” conditions (A) as, “the Tibetan ownership of private estates on the British side of the frontier will not be disturbed.”

116. This seems to be understanding of Tibetan plenipotentiary, but not as the exchanged official notes.

117. This seems to be actual Tibetan notes on the McMahon Line, where it consists of three conditions.

118. Border pass in the Myanmar (Burma) Kachen State. China and Burma had officially acknowledged that demarcation as the border between the two countries in 1950s.

119. The condition (A) in the “Tibetan Notes” is not identical to the English “Notes” conditions (A). See the note no. 104 in the case.

120. These lines are not recorded in the English “Notes”, but its content is briefly stated in the first paragraph in the English “Notes”. See the appendix I.

121. The last two paragraphs are identical to the last two paragraphs in the English “Notes”. See the appendix I.

122. This paragraph is not recorded at all in the English “Notes” as well as in the later writings on the McMahon Line. The paragraph indicates that the author of the document started to compile documents since 1913 and was still hoping that Sino-Tibetan border, between Kham and Amdo provinces to Kansu and Sichuan provinces in the 1910s will be solved. Similarly, he hoped that after the settlement of the Sino-Tibetan border issue, the Indo-Tibetan talk must resume. Although, the Dga’ ldan pho brang GOT could not settle the Sino-Tibetan border, the Simla Convention on the Indo-Tibetan border was somehow accepted and became a bilateral agreement in 1938.
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